



Formerly cited as IL ST CH 110 ¶ 13-202.2

West's Smith-hurd Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated [Currentness](#)

Chapter 735. Civil Procedure

Act 5. Code of Civil Procedure

[Article XIII.](#) Limitations

[Part 2.](#) Personal Actions

→5/13-202.2. Childhood sexual abuse

§ 13-202.2. Childhood sexual abuse.

(a) In this Section:

"Childhood sexual abuse" means an act of sexual abuse that occurs when the person abused is under 18 years of age.

"Sexual abuse" includes but is not limited to sexual conduct and sexual penetration as defined in Section 12-12 of the Criminal Code of 1961. [\[FN1\]](#)

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 10 years of the date the limitation period begins to run under subsection (d) or within 5 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse.

(c) If the injury is caused by 2 or more acts of childhood sexual abuse that are part of a continuing series of acts of childhood sexual abuse by the same abuser, then the discovery period under subsection (b) shall be computed from the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the last act of childhood sexual abuse in the continuing series occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by any act of childhood sexual abuse in the continuing series. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the last act of childhood sexual abuse in the continuing series occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse.

(d) The limitation periods under subsection (b) do not begin to run before the person abused attains the age of 18 years; and, if at the time the person abused attains the age of 18 years he or she is under other legal disability, the limitation periods under subsection (b) do not begin to run until the removal of the disability.

(d-1) The limitation periods in subsection (b) do not run during a time period when the person abused is subject to threats, intimidation, manipulation, or fraud perpetrated by the abuser or by any person acting in the interest of the abuser.

(e) This Section applies to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1990 as well as to actions commenced on or after that date. The changes made by this amendatory Act of 1993 shall apply only to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1993. The changes made by this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly apply to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly as well as actions commenced on or after that date.

CREDIT(S)

P.A. 82-280, § 13-202.2, added by [P.A. 86-1346, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1991](#). Amended by [P.A. 88-127, § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 1994](#); [P.A. 93-356, § 15, eff. July 24, 2003](#).

FORMER REVISED STATUTES CITATION

Formerly [Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, ¶ 13-202.2](#).

[\[FN1\] 720 ILCS 5/12-12](#).

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

P.A. 88-127 deleted ", but in no event may an action for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse be commenced more than 12 years after the date on which the person abused attains the age of 18 years" at the end of subsec. (b); and inserted in subsec. (e) the second sentence relating to the applicability of the changes made by the amendatory act of 1993.

P.A. 93-356, § 15, in subsec. (b), inserted "Notwithstanding any other provision of law," substituted "10 years of the date the limitation period begins to run under subsection (d) or within 5 years" for "2 years", inserted "both (i)", inserted "(ii)", and added "The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discover period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discover of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse."; in subsec. (c), inserted "both" following "reasonable diligence should discover", and added "The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the last act of childhood sexual abuse in the continuing series occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse."; inserted subsec. (d-1); and in subsec. (e), added "The changes made by this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly apply to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly as well as actions commenced on or after that date."

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

[Adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse seeking compensation from their abusers: Are Illinois courts fairly applying the discovery rule to all victims? Chrissie F. Garza, 23 N.Ill.U.L.Rev. 317 \(2003\)](#).

[Discovery rule: Allowing adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse the opportunity for redress. 61 Brook.L.Rev. 199 \(1995\)](#).

Northern's exposure: Illinois' application of the discovery rule to adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse. Chrissie F. Garza, 14 D.C.B.A. BRIEF 28 (2002).

[Repressed memory syndrome: Preventing invalid sexual abuse cases in Illinois. 21 S.Ill.U.L.J. 169 \(1996\)](#).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Limitation of Actions  31, 55(4), 72, 95(4.1).
Westlaw Topic No. 241.
[C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § § 68 to 70, 112 to 114, 167, 170](#).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

[9 ALR 5th 321](#), Running of Limitations Against Action for Civil Damages for Sexual Abuse of Child.

[11 ALR 5th 588](#), Emotional or Psychological "Blocking" or Repression as Tolling Running of Statute of Limitations.

Encyclopedias

[2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 365](#), Child Abuse-The Battered Child Syndrome.

[4 Am. Jur. Trials 441](#), Solving Statutes of Limitation Problems.

[57 Am. Jur. Trials 313](#), Trial Report: Third Party Suit Against Therapists for Implanting False Memory of Childhood Molestation.

[Illinois Law and Practice Limitations of Actions § 57](#), Childhood Sexual Abuse.

[Illinois Law and Practice Limitations of Actions § 81](#), Childhood Sexual Abuse.

Illinois Law and Practice Limitations of Actions V B REF, Divisional References.

Illinois Law and Practice Limitations of Actions VI B REF, Divisional References.

[Illinois Law and Practice Rape & Related Offenses § 31](#), General Considerations.

Forms

Nichols Illinois Civil Practice with Forms § 8:60, Discovery Rule.

Nichols Illinois Civil Practice with Forms § 90:6, Time for Commencement.

Nichols Illinois Civil Practice with Forms ADR § 8:37.10, Childhood Sexual Abuse.

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[1](#). Validity

The 1991 version of Limitations Act, which contained 12-year statute of repose on claims of childhood sexual abuse, did not violate section of Illinois Constitution that prohibits Legislature from arbitrarily eliminating cause of action, even though childhood sexual abuse was actionable at common law; Legislature was entitled to consider need to prevent problems of proof caused by stale claims. [M.E.H. v. L.H., App. 2 Dist.1996, 218 Ill.Dec. 702, 283 Ill.App.3d 241, 669 N.E.2d 1228](#), appeal allowed [221 Ill.Dec. 439, 169 Ill.2d 570, 675 N.E.2d 634](#), affirmed [226 Ill.Dec. 232, 177 Ill.2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335](#). Constitutional Law  321; Limitation Of Actions  4(2)

2. Construction and application

Statute extending time for bringing of childhood sexual abuse claim, until two years after claimant discovered that childhood sexual abuse occurred and that present injury was caused by that abuse, did not apply to claimants whose suit was barred under prior statute of limitations; defendants had vested right to prior limitations period. [Ferrer v. Kuhl, App. 2 Dist.1998, 235 Ill.Dec. 302, 301 Ill.App.3d 694, 704 N.E.2d 875](#), appeal allowed [1999 WL 197004](#), appeal allowed [238 Ill.Dec. 713, 183 Ill.2d 567, 712 N.E.2d 817](#), reversed [244 Ill.Dec. 918, 189 Ill.2d 603, 727 N.E.2d 217](#), rehearing denied. Limitation Of Actions  6(1)

3. Statute of repose, generally

Statute which placed 12-year period of repose on availability of remedy for childhood sexual abuse cases, running from date on which victim turned 18, did not apply retroactively to bar case which was pending on statute's effective date, where at time of filing case fell within two-year discovery rule and legislature subsequently deleted 12-year statute of repose but left two-year discovery rule intact. [Pedigo v. Pedigo, App. 5 Dist.1997, 227 Ill.Dec. 24, 292 Ill.App.3d 831, 686 N.E.2d 1180](#), rehearing denied, appeal denied [229 Ill.Dec. 55, 176 Ill.2d 577, 690 N.E.2d 1382](#). Limitation Of Actions  6(1)

Fact that legislature repealed 12-year statute of repose on claims of childhood sexual abuse did not permit courts to ignore that statute in deciding whether adults' claims of childhood sexual abuse by their father were time-barred; although statute was in effect for only a short time, father's right to rely on expiration of statute of repose was vested due process right. [M.E.H. v. L.H., 1997, 226 Ill.Dec. 232, 177 Ill.2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335](#).

Enactment of 12-year repose period on claims of childhood sexual abuse did not preclude adults from bringing suit and did not deprive them of cause of action until 12-year period was repealed and, thus, repeal did not revive claims that had been extinguished by statute of repose. [M.E.H. v. L.H., 1997, 226 Ill.Dec. 232, 177 Ill.2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335](#).

Statute of repose originally contained in childhood sexual abuse section of Limitations Act, which precluded complaints alleging childhood sexual abuse by persons 30 years of age or older, barred plaintiffs' complaints against their father even if Legislature had already repealed statute of repose when their claims accrued, i.e., when plaintiffs allegedly first recalled alleged abuse during psychological therapy. [M.E.H. v. L.H., App. 2 Dist.1996, 218 Ill.Dec. 702, 283 Ill.App.3d 241, 669 N.E.2d 1228](#), appeal allowed [221 Ill.Dec. 439, 169 Ill.2d 570, 675 N.E.2d 634](#), affirmed [226 Ill.Dec. 232, 177 Ill.2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335](#). Limitation Of Actions  6(9)

Statute of limitations is different from statute of repose; time limit of statute of limitations begins to run when cause of action has ripened or accrued, whereas time limit of statute of repose begins to run when specific event occurs, no matter when cause of action could accrue. [M.E.H. v. L.H., App. 2 Dist.1996, 218 Ill.Dec. 702, 283 Ill.App.3d 241, 669 N.E.2d 1228](#), appeal allowed [221 Ill.Dec. 439, 169 Ill.2d 570, 675 N.E.2d 634](#), affirmed [226 Ill.Dec. 232, 177 Ill.2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335](#). Limitation Of Actions  165

4. Retroactivity and revival

Repeal of 12-year repose period governing claims of childhood sexual abuse could not, consistent with due process, operate to revive claims; if claims were time-barred under old law, they remained time-barred even after repose period was abolished by legislature. [M.E.H. v. L.H., 1997, 226 Ill.Dec. 232, 177 Ill.2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335](#).

The 1994 Amendment to Limitations Act, which removed 12-year statute of repose contained in childhood sexual abuse section of Act, did not apply retroactively to revive plaintiffs' causes of action against their father, as statute of repose contained in original 1991 Act conferred vested right upon him, i.e., defense that plaintiffs' childhood sexual abuse claims were precluded on ground that plaintiffs were both over 30 years of age on effective date of Act (January 1, 1991), and there was nothing in amended 1994 Act to indicate that Legislature intended to revive claims previously barred by original 1991 Act. [M.E.H. v. L.H., App. 2 Dist.1996, 218 Ill.Dec. 702, 283 Ill.App.3d 241, 669 N.E.2d 1228](#), appeal allowed [221 Ill.Dec. 439, 169 Ill.2d 570, 675 N.E.2d 634](#), affirmed [226 Ill.Dec. 232, 177 Ill.2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335](#). Limitation Of Actions  6(9)

Language of statute which codified discovery rule for sexual abuse cases, does not indicate legislative intent to give retroactive application to provisions of amendatory act in face of constitutional infirmities which state has recognized in attempting to revive time-barred action. [D.P. v. M.J.O., App. 1 Dist.1994, 203 Ill.Dec. 950, 266 Ill.App.3d 1029, 640 N.E.2d 1323](#). Limitation Of Actions  6(1)

Enactment of amendatory act codifying discovery rule in sexual abuse cases, would not have been effective to revive otherwise time-barred action, but would only apply prospectively to actions which were otherwise still alive as of effective date of amendatory act and would therefore not require revival. [D.P. v. M.J.O., App. 1 Dist.1994, 203 Ill.Dec. 950, 266 Ill.App.3d 1029, 640 N.E.2d 1323](#). Limitation Of Actions  6(9)

Statute which places 12-year limit on availability of remedy for childhood sexual abuse cases may not be applied retroactively to pending case filed prior to effective date of statute. [Phillips v. Johnson, App. 3 Dist.1992, 174 Ill.Dec. 458, 231 Ill.App.3d 890, 599 N.E.2d 4](#). Limitation Of Actions  6(1)

5. Reasonable time exception

Illinois Supreme Court would apply reasonable period of time exception to statute of repose in Illinois Childhood Sexual Abuse Act, retroactively barring suits by plaintiffs after age of 30, to allow 44-year-old plaintiff suing for child sexual abuse reasonable time to file her claim following effective date of Act, where statute of repose would otherwise extinguish her claim. [Boggs v. Adams, C.A.7 \(Ill.\)1995, 45 F.3d 1056](#). Limitation Of Actions  6(1)

Courts apply reasonable period of time exception to statute of repose on case-by-case basis. [Boggs v. Adams, C.A.7 \(Ill.\)1995, 45 F.3d 1056](#). Limitation Of Actions  6(1)

Forty-four-year-old plaintiff's delay of five months after effective date of Illinois Childhood Sexual Abuse Act in filing suit under Act was reasonable, for purpose of reasonable period of time exception to statute of repose in Act barring suits by plaintiffs after age of 30, even though plaintiff knew of her cause of action at least 19 months before statute became effective, where plaintiff spent portion of time period undergoing counseling that allegedly elicited additional memories of abuse. [Boggs v. Adams, C.A.7 \(Ill.\)1995, 45 F.3d 1056](#). Limitation Of Actions  6(1)

Use of 12-year statutory repose period on claims of childhood sexual abuse was not appropriate in defining whether plaintiffs acted within reasonable time of statute's effective date, where repose period was six times longer than underlying two-year limitations period. [M.E.H. v. L.H., 1997, 226 Ill.Dec. 232, 177 Ill.2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335](#).

Adults did not file their childhood sexual abuse claims against their father within reasonable time after effective date of 12-year statute of repose, despite their claim that they were still uncovering new and different incidents of abuse, where they admitted that they discovered that they were victims of childhood sexual abuse before statute's effective date, but they did not file suit until almost three years and ten months later. [M.E.H. v. L.H., 1997, 226 Ill.Dec. 232, 177 Ill.2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335](#).

Complainant alleging sexual abuse by clergyman could not avoid statute of repose on childhood sexual abuse cases, barring action after victim reaches 30, by claiming he did not have "reasonable period of time" after statute became effective in which to sue; there was 22-month period between effective date of statute and complainant reaching his 30th birthday, and complaint was not filed until 19 months after birthday and 41 months after effective date, period which could not be considered reasonable as matter of law. [Benton v. Vonnahmen, App. 5 Dist.1997, 223 Ill.Dec. 497, 288 Ill.App.3d 199, 679 N.E.2d 1270](#). Limitation Of Actions  6(1)

Complainant's action to recover for damages caused by alleged childhood sexual abuse by clergyman was barred by statutes of limitations requiring suit within two years of time complainant possesses sufficient information to be put on inquiry whether there was injury and probable wrongful cause, even though complainant argued that it was not until he broke off relationship with clergyman at age 30 and started counseling that he realized his relationship was not special and that they were not lovers; sexual relations with clergyman began when complainant was between 15 and 18 years of age, and continued until he was 30, defendant knew at least by age 27 that sex between children and adults was illegal, complainant knew he had psychological problems since he was 14, and complainant did not

allege any repression of memory of sexual encounters. [Benton v. Vonnahmen, App. 5 Dist.1997, 223 Ill.Dec. 497, 288 Ill.App.3d 199, 679 N.E.2d 1270](#). Limitation Of Actions  95(4.1)

Discovery rule did not apply to extend two-year personal injury statute of limitations in action alleging that plaintiffs suppressed memory of child sexual abuse by their defendant father until years later, as plaintiffs were aware of abuse when it happened and injury was immediate and caused by external force, so that plaintiffs knew or should have known that defendant's conduct was actionable when it occurred; thus, because statute of limitations expired when plaintiffs turned 20 (in 1969 and 1970), they had no cause of action for childhood sexual abuse against their father upon enactment of Limitations Act (which contained 12-year statute of repose on childhood sexual abuse actions) in 1991, and they were not entitled to reasonable period of time to file their action after Act's enactment. [M.E.H. v. L.H., App. 2 Dist.1996, 218 Ill.Dec. 702, 283 Ill.App.3d 241, 669 N.E.2d 1228](#), appeal allowed [221 Ill.Dec. 439, 169 Ill.2d 570, 675 N.E.2d 634](#), affirmed [226 Ill.Dec. 232, 177 Ill.2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335](#). Limitation Of Actions  95(4.1)

6. Discovery rule

Under Illinois statute of repose addressing childhood sexual abuse, discovery period in subsection which referred to single act of sexual abuse was also applicable under subsection referring to abuse in form of continuing series of acts by same abuser and, thus, statute barred personal injury action by woman claiming she had been sexually abused as child, which was commenced more than 12 years after date on which she reached age of 18. [Johnson v. Johnson, N.D. Ill.1991, 766 F.Supp. 662](#). Limitation Of Actions  95(4.1)

Limitations period in civil actions for childhood sexual abuse begins to run only at time person discovers, or should have reasonably discovered, that she was victim of childhood sexual abuse, even though childhood sexual abuse may be characterized as "sudden traumatic event" which in other contexts precludes application of discovery rule; in certain instances, plaintiff may suffer from condition such as repressed memory which precludes her from recognizing that she has been victim of abuse. [Clay v. Kuhl, App. 2 Dist.1998, 231 Ill.Dec. 674, 297 Ill.App.3d 15, 696 N.E.2d 1245](#), appeal denied [235 Ill.Dec. 562, 179 Ill.2d 579, 705 N.E.2d 435](#). Limitation Of Actions  95(4.1)

Statutory discovery rule as applied to childhood sexual abuse applied both to fact that abuse occurred as well as to knowledge that injury was caused by such abuse. [D.P. v. M.J.O., App. 1 Dist.1994, 203 Ill.Dec. 950, 266 Ill.App.3d 1029, 640 N.E.2d 1323](#). Limitation Of Actions  95(4.1)

Action for damages arising from alleged childhood sexual abuse was barred by limitations, as plaintiff had knowledge of, or through use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, alleged abuse years before she filed her complaint; letter to her relatives showed she had knowledge of abuse at least seven years before she filed her complaint, and she testified in her deposition that she had general recollection of being abused by defendant dating from time of abuse. [Hawley v. Kenley, App. 3 Dist.1994, 199 Ill.Dec. 420, 261 Ill.App.3d 307, 634 N.E.2d 20](#). Limitation Of Actions  95(4.1)

In applying "discovery rule" of statute setting limitations period for actions for damages for personal injury based on child sexual abuse, if plaintiff discovered, or through use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, that she was victim of child sexual abuse and that abuse caused her alleged injuries, and such discovery occurred more than two years before she filed her complaint, her action is barred. [Hawley v. Kenley, App. 3 Dist.1994, 199 Ill.Dec. 420, 261 Ill.App.3d 307, 634 N.E.2d 20](#). Limitation Of Actions  95(4.1)

7. Legal disability

Woman seeking to bring personal injury action for father's allegedly sexually assaulting her when she was child failed to establish that she was under legal disability when she was 18 years old, as would have barred running of Illinois limitations period, despite multiple personality disorder diagnosis made by marriage, child and family therapy counselor; even if counselor was competent diagnostician in area of multiple personality disorder, which she was not, her conclusion that woman suffered from disability at age 18 raised no triable issue, as counselor's association with woman began when woman was age 35 and no other medical records bore on woman's mental state

at age 18. [Johnson v. Johnson, N.D. Ill.1991, 766 F.Supp. 662](#). Limitation Of Actions  74(1); Limitation Of Actions  197(1)

Plaintiff intending to rely on repressed memory as basis for application of discovery rule to toll special statute of limitations applicable to cases of childhood sexual abuse is required to plead condition with sufficient specificity to advise defendant of alleged basis for applicability of special statute; it is then for trial court to determine, as matter of law, whether condition is scientifically recognized condition that would prevent plaintiff from reasonably discovering abuse. [Clay v. Kuhl, App. 2 Dist.1998, 231 Ill.Dec. 674, 297 Ill.App.3d 15, 696 N.E.2d 1245](#), appeal denied [235 Ill.Dec. 562, 179 Ill.2d 579, 705 N.E.2d 435](#). Limitation Of Actions  179(2)

8. Knowledge of injury

Preschool teacher and school could not raise provision of Limitations Act tolling statute of limitations in cases of childhood sexual abuse until such time as victim is aware of injury as bar to suit in negligence and intentional tort by plaintiff who was two and a half years old at time of alleged sexual contact perpetrated by teacher, and who was at time of suit arguably unaware that she had been injured; provision at issue did not create any cause of action, and child's complaint did not include any statutory sexual abuse claims. [Doe By and Through Doe v. Montessori School of Lake Forest, App. 2 Dist.1997, 223 Ill.Dec. 74, 287 Ill.App.3d 289, 678 N.E.2d 1082](#). Limitation Of Actions  95(4.1)

9. Failure to protect

Illinois' special tolling provision for victims of childhood sexual abuse was inapplicable in civil rights action brought by student alleging denial of her constitutional right to be free from abuse by public school teacher. [Doe v. Board of Educ. of Hononegah Community High School Dist. No. 207, N.D. Ill.1993, 833 F.Supp. 1366](#). Limitation Of Actions  72(1)

Statute codifying the common law discovery rule as applied to personal injury suits "based on" childhood sexual abuse may apply to a non-abuser to toll the limitations period when the non-abuser had a duty to protect the child-victim; overruling [Hawley v. Kenley, 261 Ill.App.3d 307, 199 Ill.Dec. 420, 634 N.E.2d 20 \(1994\)](#); [Hobert v. Covenant Children's Home, App. 3 Dist.2000, 243 Ill.Dec. 352, 309 Ill.App.3d 640, 723 N.E.2d 384](#). Limitation Of Actions  95(4.1)

Claims of personal injury against plaintiff's grandmother that were not premised on grandmother having committed any act of childhood sexual abuse against plaintiff, but rather, upon grandmother's failure to protect her husband from committing that abuse, were governed by general two-year statute of limitations, rather than by statute providing "discovery rule" for claims for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse. [Hawley v. Kenley, App. 3 Dist.1994, 199 Ill.Dec. 420, 261 Ill.App.3d 307, 634 N.E.2d 20](#). Limitation Of Actions  95(4.1)

10. Sufficiency of pleading

Sexual abuse complainant's allegation that she had no memory of molestation at any time during her majority until February of 1995, without additional explanation as to why it was impossible for her to have sooner discovered her injury, was ambiguous and insufficient to toll statute of limitations applicable to actions for childhood sexual abuse. [Clay v. Kuhl, App. 2 Dist.1998, 231 Ill.Dec. 674, 297 Ill.App.3d 15, 696 N.E.2d 1245](#), appeal denied [235 Ill.Dec. 562, 179 Ill.2d 579, 705 N.E.2d 435](#). Limitation Of Actions  179(2)

11. Estoppel

Parish priest, church, and diocese were equitably estopped from asserting statutes of repose and limitations as defenses to former parishioner's claim of childhood sexual abuse, or in alternative their alleged actions placed parishioner under legal disability tolling statutes, where their alleged actions invoked parishioner's religious faith to

prevent her from taking legal action; priest allegedly threatened to excommunicate parishioner and her family, diocesan bishop allegedly ignored parishioner's complaint, and one church official allegedly performed ritual over parishioner and told her that her soul would die if she did not forgive priest and forget abuse. [Parks v. Kownacki, App. 5 Dist.1999, 238 Ill.Dec. 547, 305 Ill.App.3d 449, 711 N.E.2d 1208](#), appeal allowed [242 Ill.Dec. 140, 185 Ill.2d 632, 720 N.E.2d 1095](#), reversed [249 Ill.Dec. 897, 193 Ill.2d 164, 737 N.E.2d 287](#), rehearing denied. Limitation Of Actions  13

Tolling of statutes of repose and limitations by reason of equitable estoppel or plaintiff's legal disability was peculiar to plaintiff alleging childhood sexual abuse by parish priest, and did not apply to prevent derivative claims of plaintiff's husband from being treated as time-barred. [Parks v. Kownacki, App. 5 Dist.1999, 238 Ill.Dec. 547, 305 Ill.App.3d 449, 711 N.E.2d 1208](#), appeal allowed [242 Ill.Dec. 140, 185 Ill.2d 632, 720 N.E.2d 1095](#), reversed [249 Ill.Dec. 897, 193 Ill.2d 164, 737 N.E.2d 287](#), rehearing denied. Limitation Of Actions  13; Limitation Of Actions  70(1)

735 I.L.C.S. 5/13-202.2, IL ST CH 735 § 5/13-202.2

Current through P.A. 94-378, 94-380 to 94-406, 94-408 to 94-433, 94-435 to 94-446, 94-448, 94-449, 94-451 to 94-475 of the 2005 Reg. Sess.

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